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Abstract—In this paper we propose a two-way protocol of
physical layer security using the method of privacy amplification
against eavesdroppers. First we justify our proposed protocol
by analyzing the physical layer security provided by the classic
wiretap channel model (i.e. one-way protocol). In the Gaussian
channels, the classic one-way protocol requires Eve’s channel to
be degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel. However, this channel degra-
dation condition depends on Eve’s location and whether Eve’s
receiving antenna is more powerful than Bob’s. To overcome this
limitation, we introduce a two-way protocol inspired in IEEE TIT
(1993) that eliminates the channel degradation condition.
In the proposed two-way protocol, on a first phase, via
Gaussian channel, Bob sends randomness to Alice, which is
partially leaked to Eve. Then, on a second phase, Alice transmits
information to Bob over a public noiseless channel. We derive
the secrecy capacity of the two-way protocol when the channel
to Eve is also Gaussian. We show that the capacity of the two-
way protocol is always positive. We present numerical values of
the capacities illustrating the gains obtained by our proposed
protocol. We apply our result to simple yet realistic models of
satellite communication channels.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, space links, wiretap
coding, one-way protocol, two-way protocol
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security for wireless communications has
become a major research topic in recent years because it does
not need the computational assumption [1], [2], [3]. Different
properties of the wireless channel can be exploited using
information theoretical tools to prevent leakage of information
towards potential eavesdroppers. The classic wiretap model as
first proposed by Wyner [4] and then generalised by I. Csisza´r
and J. Ko¨rner [5] was later strengthened to meet cryptographic
security standards in [6] and [7], the latter framed within
spectrum information-theoretic methods [8]. We adopt such
approach here: we assume the physical layer security realized
by a stochastic wiretap encoder [9], [10], [11] based on
the privacy amplification method [12], [13]. This method
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decouples reliability and secrecy, enabling the implementation
of different security protocols.
In its simplest implementation, the wiretap channel model
using privacy amplification can be realized as a one-way secu-
rity protocol whereby Alice sends a keyless secret message to
Bob protected with universal2 hash functions [14], [15], [16].
In the Gaussian wiretap channel, secrecy capacity is positive
as long as Eve’s channel has a worse signal to noise ratio
than the channel between Alice and Bob, i.e., Eve’s channel is
degraded w.r.t the main channel between Alice and Bob [17].
The same holds to ensure positive secrecy rate in the finite-
length [18], [19]. However, when the channel between Alice
and Bob has a worse signal to noise ratio than the channel to
Eve, we cannot realize secure communication in this scenario
[20], [21], [22]. For example, in the satellite communication,
Eve’s satellite usually stays in lower orbit than the orbit of
Bob’s satellite like in the example scenario in Fig. 1, which
implies that Eve has better signal to noise ratio than Bob. That
is, it is hard to realize secure satellite communication with the
above proposals of wiretap codes if we cannot identify Eve’s
spatial locations. This type of attack is often called passive
man-in-the-middle attack [44].
Fig. 1. Illustration for our satellite communication scenario.
To resolve this problem, the papers [23], [24], [25], [26]
introduced two-way protocols, in which, the channels of
both directions are noisy Gaussian channels. However, when
both channels are noisy Gaussian channels, there still exists
a possibility that we cannot realize secure communication
dependently of Eve’s and Bob’s spatial locations. To overcome
this limitation, Maurer [27] proposed a two-way protocol
based on the binary symmetric channel. In this paper, in-
spired by Maurer’s idea, we propose a two-way protocol with
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2Gaussian wiretap channel and public noiseless feedback, in
which, the feedback channel is given as a public noiseless
channel with discrete variable. This paper assumes that the
noise in the channel of the initial transmission from Bob
to Alice is independent of the noise in that to Eve while
the paper [29] considers the case when these two noises are
correlated. Under this assumption, unless the channel of the
initial transmission to Eve is noiseless, this protocol always has
positive secure transmission rate regardless Eve’s and Bob’s
spatial locations. In particular, we focus on the simple but
realistic (for fixed user terminals) Gaussian-channel satellite
system scenarios. Our results demonstrate that our two-way
protocol greatly outperforms state-of-the-art one-way and two-
way protocols because our two-way protocol always realize
secure communication under passive man-in-the-middle attack
independently of Eve’s spatial location. Note that extension
of our results to channels with fading is straightforward, but
we take this purely averaging calculation problem out of the
scope of our paper, here we focus on the protocols for the
Gaussian channel without fading. More specifically, on the
application to the Gaussian with BPSK satellite channel, which
is considered in current satellite communication standards
[41] Further, we can equip authentication in our protocol by
attaching universal2 hash function [14], [15]. This protocol
can prevent active man-in-the-middle attack. Therefore, the
advantages of our protocol are summarized as follows.
Contribution 1) We address wiretap channel security prob-
lem (i.e. eavesdropping) and propose for the first time a novel
practical Gaussian wiretap protocol implementing theoretical
ideas in Maurer’s paper [27].
Contribution 2) Our novel two-way protocol greatly outper-
forms state-of-the-art one-way protocol because our protocol
shows always positive secrecy capacity independently of Eve’s
location (i.e. it does not require channel degradation condition
of one-way wiretap channel). This is our main technical result
based on novel and rigorous information theoretical proof.
Contribution 3) Our practical two-way protocol outperforms
other proposals of two-way protocols [23], [24], [25] in the
following sense. First, because while other two-way protocols
require several communication rounds, our protocol only re-
quires two rounds. Second, because other two-way protocols
while outperforming one-way protocol, they still may have
negative secrecy capacity. Finally, because our protocol only
requires two rounds, our protocol is highly suitable to secure
communication channels with large delay, e.g. satellite chan-
nels.
Contribution 4) We show the performance of our protocol
with meaningful numerical results for the realistic Gaussian
BPSK modulated satellite channel, which is included in current
satellite communication standards [41]. For this, we use our
system modeling which allows to evaluate the security capac-
ity as a function of the system parameters. Hence, our method
and results are useful for secure communication design.
One might consider that the real feedback channel is also
a noisy channel. However, if we choose sufficiently strong
intensity and a suitable error correcting code, the information
transmission of the feedback channel can be regarded as a
noiseless channel. In this case, we can regard the feedback
channel as a noiseless public channel with discrete variable.
In contrast, the noise of the initial Gaussian channel is essential
because its presence makes the difference between mutual
informations from Alice to Bob and Eve. Furthermore, the
information leakage in the channel during the second phase
needs not be considered because information leakage is only
relevant on the first phase. Hence, it is allowed to make
the power of the transmission signal very strong in the
second phase while we cannot use such a strong power in
the first phase to control the secrecy. Since the information
transmission rate with the strong power is much larger than
that with the weak power, the consuming time of the first
phase is dominant in comparison with that of the second phase
is dominant. That is, the first phase is the bottleneck in this
setting. Therefore, this paper optimizes the amount of noise in
the initial Gaussian channel to maximize the wiretap capacity
in this model.
In fact, the paper [31] considers a similar topic. It is a follow
up of this submission with practical focus. Hence, it contains
only the brief description of the two-way protocol without
proper proof. Also, the analysis of the secure satellite com-
munication in [31] is different from our analysis in Sections
IV and V. That is, it did not consider the optimization while
the analysis in this paper is based on the optimization given
in Section IV.
Relations to other studies are summarized as follows. While
the paper [26] discusses two-way wiretap channels, it con-
siders a new scheme cooperative jamming. The scheme in
[26] has several users that are cooperative while this paper
has only two cooperative users, the legitimate sender and the
legitimate receiver. Therefore, the method in this paper cannot
be compared with [26]. In the paper [45], Bob feeds back some
randomness that is used as a secret key, exactly like the present
manuscript. However, it assumes that the feedback is noiseless
and secure, so Eve does not observe it, which is different from
here. In the paper [46], unlike the present work, Bob does not
control the feedback link. However, it allows all players to
observe everything. Hence, the method in this paper cannot
be compared with the results [45], [46].
Our work is structured as follows. In Section II, we review
the results of one-way standard protocol. In Section III,
we propose our two-way protocol. In Section IV, we make
numerical optimization for our obtained secret capacities. In
Section V, we apply our result to simple realistic models of
satellite communication. Finally in Section VI we discuss the
protocol and draw some conclusions.
II. ONE-WAY PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY PROTOCOLS
A. Signal and channel Model
First, we review the results of one-way standard protocol
with Gaussian channels, which model wireless channels in
relevant realistic communication scenarios such as satellite
radiofrequency communication channels. The signal variables
received by Bob and Eve can be modeled as
Y ′ =
√
EsV +
√
nBN1, Z ′ = γg
√
EsV +
√
γnnBN2, (1)
where V is a variable modeling the transmitted signal and
Es is the energy per symbol expressed in Joules. Y ′ is the
3random variable representing the signal received at the legiti-
mate receiver, Z ′ the random variable representing the signal
received at the eavesdropper’s receiver and N1 and N2 are
zero-mean circular complex Gaussian random variables with
unit variance. nB is the noise spectral density power of Bob’s
receiver expressed in Joules per Hertz. The coefficient γg
models the amplitude attenuation of the wiretapper’s channel
w.r.t. the legitimate channel. The analytical expression of
γg will depend on the system under analysis as well as
the channel assumptions and corresponding time scale. The
multiplicative coefficient γn expresses wiretapper’s receiver
noise with respect to Bob’s receiver noise. Denote the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) for Bob as
ηB =
Es
nB
=
P
NB
where P and NB are the system and noise power at Bob’s
receiver, respectively both expressed in Watts. We can then
rewrite the signal model as
Y =
√
ηBV + N1, Z = γB
√
ηBV + N2; (2)
where Y = Y ′/√nB, Z = Z ′/√γnnB and γB := γg/√γn.
Hence, N1 and N2 are zero-mean circular complex Gaussian
random variables with unit variance.
Fig. 2. Graphical illustration of the one way protocol with Gaussian channels.
NB and NE are noise powers at Bob’s and Eve’s receivers.
B. Secrecy capacity with BPSK modulation and soft decision
In the one-way model, Alice sends the encoded information
to Bob via channel (2) as Fig. 2. Now, we assume the BPSK
modulation, in which, Alice encodes her binary information
A ∈ F2 to V = (−1)A. In this scenario, the secrecy capacity
COWsoft (γB, ηB) for the one-way protocol is given as [19, (46)]
COWsoft (γB, ηB) =I(A;Y ) − I(A; Z)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
u
[
1√
8pi
(
e−
(y−√ηB )2
2 + e−
(y+√ηB )2
2
)]
dy
−
∫ ∞
−∞
u
[
1√
8pi
(
e−
(z−γB√ηB )2
2 +e−
(z+γB√ηB )2
2
)]
dz,
where u(x) := −x log x when
γB < 1, i.e., γ2g < γn. (3)
Also, when the condition (3) does not hold, the capacity is
zero. In this case, we cannot realize secure communication
in this scheme. Here, Bob and Eve are assumed to store the
sequence of the received continuous signals and apply the
decoder to them. This type of information processing is called
soft decision decoding [42].
C. Secrecy capacity with BPSK modulation and hard decision
To save the cost of decoding, the receiver converts the
received continuous signal to a binary signal in the reception
and apply the decoder to the sequence of the binary signals.
This type of information processing is called hard decision
decoding [42]. When the receiver applies this method, it is
sufficient to store only binary signals, which saves the memory
of the receiver. Here, as another scenario, we consider the
case when Bob and Eve obtain B and E using hard decision
detection on their received signals Y and Z as defined in
the previous sections, respectively. The crossover probability
between Alice and Bob induced by the Bernoulli random
variable X1 is given as ∗B = 0.5erfc(
√
ηB/2) and the crossover
probability between Alice and Eve induced by the Bernoulli
random variable X2 is given as ∗E = 0.5erfc(γB
√
ηB/2) with
erfc(t) := 2√
pi
∫ ∞
t
e−t
2
dt . (4)
In this scenario, by using the binary entropy function h(x) :=
−x log x − (1− x) log(1− x), the secrecy capacity for the one-
way protocol is given as
COWhard(γB, ηB) = h(∗E ) − h(∗B), (5)
which is positive only when ∗E > 
∗
B, which is equivalent to
(3).
III. TWO-WAY PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY PROTOCOL
WITH GAUSSIAN CHANNELS AND BPSK MODULATION
A. Signal and channel Model
One-way model requires the condition that the mutual
information between the sender and the legitimate receiver is
larger than that between the sender and the eavesdropper. This
assumption does not hold when the eavesdropper performs
passive man-in-the-middle attack. To resolve this problem, we
consider two-way protocol for the Gaussian channel and BPSK
modulation as follows. In an initial step, Bob sends a random
variable V to Alice. In this case, Alice and Eve obtain the
variables Y and Z , respectively, as follows.
Y =
√
ηAV + N1, Z = γA
√
ηAV + N2, (6)
where N1 and N2 are zero-mean circular complex Gaussian
random variables with unit variance and the coefficient γA
models the amplitude attenuation of the wiretapper’s channel
w.r.t. the legitimate channel (which is now between Bob
and Alice and not between Alice and Bob). Notice that the
transmitter of the noisy Gaussian channel (6) is not Alice who
is the sender of the secret message of this protocol. Therefore
ηA is now
ηA =
Es
nA
=
P
NA
,
where nA is the noise spectral density power of Alice’s receiver
expressed in Joules per Hertz.
4Bob generates the binary variable B ∈ F2 subject to the
binary uniform distribution, and sends V = (−1)B via the
above RF channel. Applying hard decision decoding to Y ,
Alice obtains the binary variable A. In the next step, Alice
prepares another binary variable X , and sends X ′ := X ⊕ A to
Bob via a public channel. When X is regarded as the channel
input information, the legitimate receiver’s output is B and
X ′ while the eavesdropper’s output is Z and X ′. The overall
process along with the generated random variables is shown
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Graphical illustration of the two-way protocol with Gaussian channels.
Phase 1 is shown in red and Phase 2 is shown in black.
B. Protocol
Based on the above discussion, we fully describe our
concrete protocol. For this aim, we fix an error correction
code, i.e., the pair of the encoder φe,n and the decoder φd,n
with block length n. Then, combining the error correction code
and universal2 hash functions [14], [15], [16], we employ the
wiretap code given in [19, Appendix A] using random seed
S and we have the wiretap encoder φe,n |S and the wiretap
decoder φd,n |S . This code construction achieves the strong
secrecy even in the continuous system [9], [18], [19].
Then, we propose the following two way protocol.
(1) Bob generates the binary data sequence B1, . . . , Bn ∈
F2. Then, sends (−1)B1, . . . , (−1)Bn via the channel
described in (6).
(2) Alice makes the hard decision. Then, she obtains
the binary data A1, . . . , An. In this case, Ai and
Bi are connected via the binary symmetric channel
with crossover probability A, whose mathematical
expression will be given later.
(3) To send the secret message M , using an aux-
iliary variable L, Alice applies the code Xn =
(X1, . . . , Xn) := φe,n |S(M, L) ∈ Fn2 . Then, Alice sends
X ′n = (X ′1, . . . , X ′n) to Bob via public channel, where
X ′i := Ai ⊕ Xi . Here, an auxiliary variable L is a
variable independent of the message M , and is used
to realize the secrecy of M .
(4) Bob decodes M by φd,n |S(Xn ′′), where Xn ′′ =
(X ′′1 , . . . , X ′′n ) and X ′′i := X ′i ⊕ Bi .
To realize the public channel from Alice to Bob in the
second phase, they employ the RF channel (2) with an error
correcting code (φˆe,nˆ, φˆd,nˆ) different from the error correction
φe,n |S so that the decoding error probability of the code
(φˆe,nˆ, φˆd,nˆ) is close to zero (i.e., the bit error rate is e.g. below
10−6). Here, if the coding rate of the code (φˆe,nˆ, φˆd,nˆ) is Rˆ, they
use the RF channel (2) nˆ = n/Rˆ times in Step (3) physically.
That is, in Step (3), Alice sends Xˆ nˆ = φˆe,nˆ(X ′n) to Bob via
the RF channel (2) of coefficient ηB. Also, in Step (4), to get
X ′n, Bob applies the decoder φˆd,nˆ to the received nˆ symbols
via the RF channel (2) of coefficient ηB. Indeed, when the bit
error rate of the public channel (i.e., the bit error rate of the
code (φˆe,nˆ, φˆd,nˆ)) is e.g. below 10−6, it can be negligible in
comparison with the bit error rate between A and B. Hence,
we can consider that the bit error rate of the channel from Xi
to X ′′i given in Steps (3) and (4) almost equals that between
A and B, in practice.
The above description has no authentication. However, it is
possible by attaching using universal2 hash function [14], [15],
which prevents active man-in-the-middle attack [44], while it
is difficult to avoid active man-in-the-middle attacks without
authentication [43]. The detail is discussed in [28] and the
arXiv version of [29].
C. Secrecy capacity when Eve uses hard decision
When Eve has limited memory, it is natural that Eve uses
hard detection decoding when receiving Z so that Eve obtains
the binary variable E .
Indeed, the first phase can be regarded as a preparation
step for the secure communication. In order to prevent Eve to
make soft decision, Alice and Bob can consider the following
strategy. Before starting the second phase, Alice and Bob
continue the first phase so that the length of their obtained
random numbers A1, . . . , An and B1, . . . , Bn is close to the
limitation of their memory. In this case, the length of their
obtained random numbers is across several coding blocks.
Since satellite has a limitation of size of memory due to the
limitation of physical space. it is natural that the size of Eve’s
memory is similar to that of Alice and Bob. In this case,
it is difficult for Eve to keep the all the outcomes of soft
decision, i.e., Eve needs to choose hard decision in this case.
For example, the preceding paper [47], which is oriented to an
application side, analyzed the security for the Poisson wiretap
channel when Eve has limited memory, i.e., Eve uses hard
detection decoding.
Using two independent Bernoulli random variables X1 and
X2 on F2, we have
A = B ⊕ X1, E = B ⊕ X2. (7)
The crossover probability between A and B is A =
0.5erfc(√ηA/2) and the crossover probability between E and
B is E = 0.5erfc(γA
√
ηA/2), where erfc(t) is defined in (4).
Hence, the problem is reduced to the case with BSC channels,
5which was discussed by Maurer [27]. Hence, the capacity
CTWhard(γA, ηA) when Eve uses hard detection is calculated to
CTWhard(γA, ηA) = I(A; B |E) = I(A; B) − I(A; E)
=H(B) − H(B |A) − (H(E) − H(E |A))
=H(E |A) − H(B |A) = h(E + A − 2EA) − h(A) (8)
because H(B) = H(E) = h( 12 ) and the probability of E , A is
E (1− A)+ (1− E )A = E + A−2EA. When γA = γB and
ηA = ηB, i.e., ∗B = A and 
∗
E = E , we have
CTWhard(γA, ηA) ≥ COWhard(γB, ηB) (9)
because h(E + A − 2EA) = h(E + A(1 − 2E )) ≥ h(E ) =
h(∗E ).
D. Secrecy capacity when Eve uses soft decision
When Eve has sufficient size of memory and her com-
putation power is unlimited, she can employ soft decision
decoding. That is, to consider Eve’s best strategy, we need
to address the case when Eve uses the variables Z and X ′. To
analyze this case, we use the Markov chain A − B − Z . We
focus on the wiretap channel composed of the main channel
WB := PB,X′ |X and the eavesdropper channel WE := PZ,X′ |X .
Since A = X ′ ⊕ X , we have PB,X′ |X (b, x ′ |x) = PB |A(b|x ′ ⊕
x)PA(x ′ ⊕ x). Hence, the Markov chain A − B − Z condition
guarantees that
PZ,X′ |X (z, x ′ |x)
=
∑
b
PZ |B(z |b)PB |A(b|x ′ ⊕ x)PA(x ′ ⊕ x)
=
∑
b
PZ |B(z |b)PB,X′ |X (b, x ′ |x). (10)
Thus, the channel WE is a degraded channel of the channel
WB. Further, the channels WB and WE are symmetric, the
wiretap capacity is attained when PX is the binary uniform
distribution, and the wiretap capacity CTWsoft (γA, ηA) is calcu-
lated to
CTWsoft (γA, ηA) = I(X; X ′B) − I(X; X ′Z)
=I(X; X ′) + I(X; B |X ′) − (I(X; X ′) + I(X; Z |X ′))
=I(A ⊕ X ′; B |X ′) − I(A ⊕ X ′; Z |X ′)
=I(A; B |X ′) − I(A; Z |X ′) (a)= I(A; B) − I(A; Z)
=I(A; BZ) − I(A; Z) = I(A; B |Z), (11)
where (a) follows from the independence of X ′ from A, B, Z ,
which can be shown by the uniformity of the conditional
distribution PX′ |A. Therefore, the wiretap capacity CTWsoft is
always positive regardless of γA, regardless the condition
γA < 1 does not hold. The wiretap capacity expresses the limit
of the secure transmission rate when we use a proper coding
under the condition that the mutual information between the
message and Eve’s information goes to zero.
Further, the probability PZ and the conditional probability
PB |Z are calculated as
PZ (z) =
1∑
b=0
PZ,B(z, b) =
1∑
b=0
PZ |B(z |b)PB(b)
=
1
2
√
2pi
(e− (z+γA
√
ηA)2
2 + e−
(z−γA
√
ηA)2
2 ), (12)
PB |Z (b|z) =
PB,Z (b, z)
PZ (z) =
PZ |B(z |b)PB(b)
PZ (z) =
PZ |B(z |b)
2PZ (z)
=
e−
(z−(−1)bγA
√
ηA)2
2
e−
(z+γA
√
ηA)2
2 + e−
(z−γA
√
ηA)2
2
. (13)
Hence, due to the Markov chain Z − B − A, we can calculate
the conditional mutual information;
I(A; B |Z = z) = h
(
PB |Z (0|z)A + PB |Z (1|z)(1 − A)
)
− h(A).
Notice that I(A; B |Z = z) = 0 if and only if PB |Z (0|z) is 0 or
1. Hence, the capacity CTWsoft (γA, ηA) with Eve’s soft decision
is calculated as a function of ηA, γ by
CTWsoft (γA, ηA) = I(A; B |Z)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
PZ (z)dz
(
h
(
PB |Z (0|z)A + PB |Z (1|z)(1 − A)
)
− h(A)
)
.
(14)
Thus, unless PB |Z (0|z) is 0 or 1 for all z, (14) is strictly
positive. That is, when γA is a finite value, PB |Z (0|z) is an
intermediate value between 0 and 1 for all z. Hence, the
capacity CTWsoft (γA, ηA) is strictly positive.
Even in this scenario, when X is also subject to the
uniform distribution, B ⊕ X ′ is Bob’s sufficient statistics with
respect to X . Hence, we have I(X; X ′ ⊕ B) − I(X; X ′Z) =
I(X; X ′B) − I(X; X ′Z) = CTWsoft (γA, ηA). Therefore, even when
Bob uses only B ⊕ X ′ for his decoding while Eve uses the
two variables Z and X ′, the capacity CTWsoft (γA, ηA) can be
attained. Consequently, the channel WB can be modeled as
a computation channel as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Bob’s computation channel model for the two-way protocol. Indepen-
dently of whether Eve uses hard or soft detection, two-way secrecy capacity
can be attained with this computation model.
Now, we compare CTWsoft (γA, ηA) and COWsoft (γB, ηB) when
γA = γB = γ and ηA = ηB = η. For this comparison, we
fix η and change γ. Due to the above discussion, when γ > 1,
CTWsoft (γ, η) is larger than COWsoft (γ, η). In contrast, under the limit
γ → 0, we have
lim
γ→0
CTWsoft (γ, η) = log 2 − h(A) = I(BTW; ATW) < I(BTW;YTW)
=I(AOW;YOW) = I(XOW;YOW) = lim
γ→0
COWsoft (γ, η), (15)
where the subscripts TW and OW of the random variables
express the protocol to be considered. This opposite inequality
6is caused by the hard decision on Alice’s received signal Y in
the two way protocol. Therefore, when γ is smaller than a
certain threshold, CTWsoft (γ, η) is smaller than COWsoft (γ, η). That
is, the one-way protocol may have greater capacity than the
two-way protocol for some threshold of γ. We have computed
the value of such threshold as a function of the SNR, which
is shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. Threshold values of γ at which COWsoft (γ, η) equals CTWsoft (γ, η).
IV. OPTIMIZATION
Here, to extract a higher communication speed, we consider
how to optimize the channel parameters in the RF channel (6).
When the power of transmitting antenna of Bob increases, the
coefficient ηA increases and the ratio between the coefficients
of signal in Alice’s and Eve’s sides is not changed. For simple
analysis, we first assume that Alice and Bob can know the
value of ηA by using test transmission, and control it by
changing the power of transmitting antenna of Bob, where
other components (e.g., the receiving antenna gains of Alice
and Eve, the directions of antennas etc) are fixed. In practice,
it is not so easy to know the value of the ratio γA because it
depends on Eve’s position. However, if we know the type of
Eve’s orbit, we know the range G of possible values of γA. In
this case, we consider the worst case for Alice and Bob, i.e.,
γA,max := maxγA∈G γA. In fact, when we have two possible
values γA,1 > γA,2 for the ratio, the channel to Eve with γA,2
is a degraded channel of the channel to Eve with γA,1. Hence 1,
a secure code for the channel to Eve with γA,1 is also secure
for the channel to Eve with γA,2. Therefore, it is sufficient
to prepare a code with the largest value γA,max. We optimize
CTWhard(γA,max, ηA) and CTWsoft (γA,max, ηA) by changing ηA. Here,
1Note that in a traditional communication scenario, the transmission power
is designed so that the link budget can provide a required link quality (e.g. in
terms of target bit error rate) is met. However, here we are designing a secure
communication scenario and therefore the link budget is constrained to meet
the security requirements. Such security requirement means here that the link
budget is designed to provide the maximum secrecy capacity.
the parameter ηA = P/NA can be changed by changing the
power P. The optimum secret capacities are given as
CTWsoft (γA,max) := maxηA C
TW
soft (γA,max, ηA) (16)
CTWhard(γA,max) := maxηA C
TW
hard(γA,max, ηA). (17)
Hence, we need to find suitable value for ηA dependently
of γA,max. ηTWsoft (γA,max) := argmaxηACTWsoft (γA,max, ηA) and
ηTWhard(γA,max) := argmaxηACTWhard(γA,max, ηA) are the optimal
intensities of ηA.
In fact, we can apply a similar optimization to the one way
case. In this case, we consider the following optimum secret
capacities;
COWsoft (γB,max) := maxηB C
OW
soft (γB,max, ηB) (18)
COWhard(γB,max) := maxηB C
OW
hard(γB,max, ηB), (19)
where γB,max is the maximum value among possible val-
ues of γB. ηOWsoft (γB,max) := argmaxηBCOWsoft (γB,max, ηB) and
ηOWhard(γB,max) := argmaxηBCOWhard(γB,max, ηB) are the optimal
intensities of ηB.
Now we show numerical calculations to compare the ca-
pacities of the one-way protocol and the two-way protocol.
For easy visualization, we calculate numerical values assuming
ηB = ηA and γA = γB.
Fig. 6. Comparison among the optimum secret capacities CTWsoft (γA,max),
CTWhard(γA,max), COWsoft (γB,max), and COWhard(γB,max). The vertical axis expresses
these optimal capacities. The horizontal axis expresses γA,max and γB,max
with log scale, which runs from 10−3 to 102.
Fig. 6 shows the comparison among the optimum se-
cret capacities CTWsoft (γA,max), CTWhard(γA,max), COWsoft (γB,max), and
COWhard(γB,max). We can observe that while for the one-way
protocol the capacity is zero whenever the eavesdropper has
7Fig. 7. Comparison of OW and TW optimal secrecy capacities assuming
γB,max = γA,max = γmax.
higher SNR than Bob, in the two-way protocol the capacity
is always positive and greater than zero. We have computed
the difference between optimal secrecy capacities COWsoft (γB,max)
and CTWsoft (γA,max) for γB,max = γA,max = γmax as Fig. 7. We
observe that as obtained theoretically in (15), the OW secrecy
capacity is slightly bigger than the TW secrecy capacity when
the channel to Bob is advantageous over that to Eve. However,
also in agreement with the theoretical derivations, the TW
secrecy capacity starts to be bigger than the OW when the
channel to Bob is not so advantageous over that to Eve.
In Fig. 7, we observe in the zoom plot that this occurs at
γmax = 0.3185.
Fig. 8 shows the optimal intensities ηTWsoft (γA,max),
ηTWhard(γA,max), ηOWsoft (γB,max), and ηOWhard(γB,max). These values
are the optimal choices for the intensity ηA or ηB in the
respective cases.
V. APPLICATION TO REAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATION
Now, we apply our analysis to the following two types of
real satellite communication scenarios.
(I) The transmitter is the earth station and the legitimate
receiver is the GEO satellite in the noisy Gaussian
channels (2) and (6). That is, Alice is the earth station
and Bob is the GEO satellite in the OW, and Bob
is the earth station and Alice is the GEO satellite
in the TW. Notice that the noiseless public channel
from the GEO satellite to the earth station is also
required by using a proper combination of wireless
communication and outer error correcting code in
the TW. The noisy Gaussian channels (2) and (6) of
these scenarios are explained in the two figures on
the top in Fig 9, which describe the case when the
Earth station is the information data communication
source in the noisy Gaussian channel. In this case,
the eavesdropper, Eve is a low Earth orbit (LEO)
satellite or a medium Earth orbit (MEO) satellite.
Fig. 8. Optimal intensities ηTWsoft (γA,max), ηTWhard(γA,max), ηOWsoft (γB,max), and
ηOWhard(γB,max). The vertical axis expresses these optimal intensities with log
scale. The horizontal axis expresses γA,max and γB,max with log scale, where
γA,max runs from 10−3 to 102, but γB,max runs from 10−3 to 1.
(II) The transmitter is the GEO satellite and the le-
gitimate receiver is the earth station in the noisy
Gaussian channels (2) and (6). That is, Alice is the
GEO satellite and Bob is the earth station in the
OW, and Bob is the GEO satellite and Alice is the
earth station in the TW. The noisy Gaussian channels
(2) and (6) of these scenarios are explained in the
two figures on the down in Fig 9, which describe
the case when the GEO satellite is the information
data communication source in the noisy Gaussian
channel. In this case, Eve is an LEO satellite, an
MEO satellite, or a GEO satellite.
Let α(θ) be the normalised transmitter’s antenna radiation’s
pattern of the earth station in response to the angle θ from
the boresight axis directed to the GEO satellite to account
for spatial attenuation. The function α(θ) can be considered
exactly in case the (normalized) antenna pattern is known, or
otherwise it can be considered in terms of the allowed emission
of radiation according to space regulations. A typical analytical
expression for α(θ) is
α(θ) := J1(k sin(θ))
2k sin(θ) + 36
J3(k sin(θ))
(k sin(θ))3 (20)
where k = 2.0712/sin(θ3dB), with θ3dB being the one-sided
half-power angular beamwidth and J1 and J3 are the Bessel
functions of the first kind, of order one and three respectively.
Our interest is the parameter α(θE ) in the specific angle θE
between Bob’s and Eve’s directions. gL and gE are legitimate
and eavesdropper’s receiver’s antenna gains towards Earth
8Fig. 9. Geometry considered to illustrate the real satellite communication
secrecy analysis. The two figures on the top describe Case (I), in which the
Earth station is the source in the noisy Gaussian channels (2) and (6). The two
figures on the bottom describe Case (II), in which the satellite is the source
in the noisy Gaussian channels (2) and (6). The geometries for OW (left)
and TW (right) cases illustrate LEO and MEO orbit heights. The dashed line
expresses the noiseless public channel from Alice to Bob in the TW case. The
eavesdropper can be at any LEO or MEO orbit while the legitimate transmitter
and receiver are either the earth station of the GEO satellite.
station. Now we introduce a model for the coefficient that
gives Eve’s signal strength relative to Bob’s signal in (2) and
(6) (see [18][19][31]). We first introduce the parameter µ to
account for the relative antenna gain, i.e., µ :=
√
gL/gE . We
also define β (r, ρE ) to account for relative propagation losses
between Bob and Eve as
β2 (r, ρE ) =
ρ2L
ρrE
. (21)
The exponent r accounts for the power attenuation decay that
affects eavesdropper’s propagation channel. Different values of
the exponent model correspond to different assumptions about
eavesdropper. Specifically, the eavesdropper can be modeled
as a terrestrial, aerial or satellite station. For example, while
for the satellite case r = 2, in case of aerial eavesdropper, a
good assumption is to consider a large scale two-ray ground
multipath model,with r > 2. Then, we discuss the parameter
γB in the OW (2) and the parameter γA in the TW (6) because
the channel (2) in the OW case is the same as the channel (6)
in the TW case in each scenario (I) or (II). These parameters
are given as
γ(θE, ρE, r, µ, γn) := α (θE ) µβ (r, ρE )√
γn
, (22)
where, γn is the ratio between the powers of the noises in
legitimate receiver’s and eavesdropper’s detectors. In doing a
secrecy analysis, we assume in which orbit Eve is, but we
don’t make any assumption on which angle she is (since she
is orbiting). In this case, to guarantee the security, we need to
consider the worst case. For this aim, we consider the possible
range R of the value (θE, ρE ). Then, the maximums of γB and
γA are calculated to
γB,max = γA,max = max(θE,ρE )∈R
γ(θE, ρE, r, µ, γn). (23)
Now, we assume representative values for Eve’s possible
orbits according to basic orbital mechanics [30] and usual low
or medium orbit terminology. In Case (I), when Eve is MEO
(LEO), we assume that the height of Eve’s orbit runs from
ρMEOmin = 5000 to ρMEOmax = 20000 km (ρLEOmin = 150
to ρLEOmax = 2000 km). Also, we assume that the height of
our GEO orbit is ρGEO = 36000 km. Since the maximum of
α (θE ) is realized by θE = 0◦, when Eve is MEO (LEO),
we have γ(0◦, ρE, r, µ, γn) = µρGEO
ρ
r/2
MEOmin
√
γn
(= µρGEO
ρ
r/2
LEOmin
√
γn
). For
illustration, we now assume Eve equally powerful than the
legitimate receiver, i.e. µ = 1 and γn = 1. Also, we have r = 2
for both LEO and MEO. Hence, the maximum γB,max = γA,max
is given as γ(I)MEO := ρGEOρMEOmin = 36000/5000 = 7.2 for the
case when Eve is MEO, and it is given as γ(I)LEO := ρGEOρLEOmin =
36000/150 = 240 for the case when Eve is LEO. Then,
we have the capacities of the worst case as Table I. While
these capacities are small in comparison with the conventional
communication, we see that the secure communication is
possible in these scenarios only in the TW case.
Applying same reasoning in Case (II), when Eve is MEO,
the minimum of ρE is ρGEO − ρMEOmax at θE = 0◦ and
the maximum of α (θE ) is realized by θE = 0◦. The same
observation holds when Eve is LEO or GEO. In this case,
it seems reasonable to assume the legitimate receiver having
a more powerful antenna gain and less detector noise than
the eavesdropper. Hence, we can again assume µ = 1 and
γn = 1. Again, we also have r = 2. Therefore, when Eve
is MEO, the maximum γB,max = γA,max is calculated to
be γ(II)MEO := ρGEO(ρGEO−ρMEOmax) = 36000/(36000 − 20000) =
9/4. When Eve is LEO, it is calculated to be γ(II)LEO :=
ρGEO
(ρGEO−ρLEOmax) = 36000/(36000 − 2000) = 18/17. When Eve
is GEO, the minimum distance between the transmitter of the
initial transmission and Eve is 1km. Hence, it is calculated as
γ(II)GEO := ρGEO1 = 36000.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS
We have introduced a two-way protocol for the BPSK
modulation to overcome the limitations of the classic (one-
way) wiretap physical layer security protocol. While the
secrecy capacity of the one-way protocol is negative when
Eve’s channel is better than Bob’s channel (i.e γB > 1),
we show that the two-way protocol always provides positive
9TABLE I
SUMMARY OF OPTIMUM CAPACITIES IN SATELLITE MODELS
γB,max = γA,max C
TW
soft C
TW
hard C
OW
soft C
OW
hard
γ(I)MEO 0.029 0.036 0 0
γ(I)LEO 3.6 × 10−4 3.9 × 10−4 0 0
γ(II)GEO 1.4 × 10−12 1.4 × 10−12 0 0
γ(II)MEO 0.086 0.108 0 0
γ(II)LEO 0.159 0.198 0 0
capacity with higher gains even for γA ≥ 1 and γB ≥ 1 when
the noises exist and are independent. We have shown that
the one-way protocol cannot realize secure communication
in realistic scenarios of satellite communication, while our
two-way protocol can realize secure communication in these
realistic scenarios. Notice that this conclusion does not change
whenever the maximum of possible values of γA and γB is
greater than 1.
For example, in the scenario (I), we have the transmission
rate 3.6×10−4 with the worst case analysis in the two-way
protocol with Eve’s soft decision while the eavesdropper has
an extremely stronger power in the detection process than
the legitimate receiver, i.e., the eavesdropper has 240 times
power in the receiving signal as the legitimate receiver. The
conventional one-way method cannot realize secure communi-
cation in this case. This numerical analysis shows that even in
this case, we can realize secure communication with the same
physical device if we accept approximately e.g. one thousandth
reduction of the speed of the conventional communication
without secrecy (e.g., 1 Gbps is reduced to 1 Mbps). While
this cost seems very large, the cost is still much smaller than
quantum key distribution (QKD) [32] due to the following
reason. Since QKD requires expensive devices, it is available
only for extremely limited users (big governments and/or big
military organizations). However, since the proposed method
is based on the conventional satellite system, even though the
transmission speed is very low, it is available for ordinary
users. In fact, the user can use the proposed system when the
size of communication is reduced, e.g., the user uses only e-
mail instead of video. On the other hand, in the scenario (II),
we assume that the receiving antenna of the earth station has
almost same performance as that of Eve. Under such a worst
case assumption, we obtain very small transmission speed.
To improve this, the receiving antenna of the earth station
needs to be more powerful than that of Eve. However, to
realize this condition, the earth station needs to prepare an
expensive receiving device, which may or may not imply to
restrict ordinary users since such higher cost is shared by
all service/users sharing the earth station. In this sense, the
scenario (II) may seem less practical for ordinary users. In any
case, to realize secure communication, it is sufficient to share
secure keys between two users. because one-time use of shared
secure key realizes secure communication with both directions.
Hence, it is sufficient to establish secure communication only
with one direction. Therefore, the scenario (I) of TW is enough
for our purpose.
However, in the scenario (I) of TW, if Eve is an eavesdrop-
ping terrestrial node, e.g., a drone near the terrestrial earth
station, she has better performance than LEO/MEO satellite. In
this case, the secure transmission rate is worse than 3.6×10−4
when the angle θE is set to be 0. However, the possible
minimum angle θE of this case in practice is larger than that in
the case with an eavesdropping LEO/MEO satellite. Therefore,
it is needed to evaluate the secure transmission rate with an
eavesdropping terrestrial node and the possible minimum angle
θE . However, it is not so easy to find the minimum angle
θE among practically possible values. Therefore, this type of
analysis is remained as a future study.
As the price to pay, the protocol requires higher delay to
establish the secure channel when compared to the one-way.
However, this cost is much cheaper than the previous two-
way protocols in the papers [23], [24], [25], [26] because they
require many rounds of communication while our protocol
requires only two rounds of communication. On the other
hand, the transmission of information can be over a public
channel while for randomness sharing, the channel needs to
be previously authenticated like [29], [28]. As discussed in
[29], [28], the required amount of the random numbers shared
between Alice and Bob in advance is the logarithm order of
the size of intended secure communication. Also, this cost
is much cheaper than the realization of quantum key distri-
bution. Therefore, considering the cost-benefit performance,
we find that our two-way method is useful. Furthermore, the
bias of the variable B may reduce the effectiveness of the
protocol and reduce the secrecy capacity gains. To improve
this problem, we often distill uniform random numbers from
the thermal noise. It is known that it is possible to distill
uniform random numbers by applying a hash function to a
biased random numbers [12], [13], [9], [10]. To obtain the
ultimate secure uniform random number, we may employ
quantum random number generator [33], [34], [35], which
requires much cheaper cost than quantum key distribution
because it does not need quantum communication.
Unfortunately, this paper discusses only the asymptotic
performance. Since the implemented communication system
has finite-length codes, we need to evaluate the security of
finite-length codes for its practical application [36], [37], [38],
[39], [40]. Since the finite-length analysis depends on the
choice of the security criterion, we need to be careful of its
choice [7], [10]. As such a study is beyond the focus on this
paper, it is considered as a future study. Furthermore, it is
well known that a good model for the land mobile satellite
(LMS) channel model is a Markov model [48]. Hence, it is
a completely different channel from (6). Therefore, follow
up studies also include considering different satellite channel
models such as fading models accounting for frequency-
dependent atmospheric effects and for the case of mobile
(legitimate) users.
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